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INTRODUCTION
The centuries-long struggle between development and conserva-
tion has gone through numerous iterations. Most recently, the
struggle has pitted conservation easements against oil and gas
development in Marcellus and Utica Shale states. While conserva-
tion organizations have used conservation easements with enthusi-
asm for many years as a means of preserving land for future
generations,1 new technological breakthroughs and the discovery of
deep natural gas deposits have led some commentators to question
the continued effectiveness of conservation easements.2 Moreover,
the economic potential from oil and gas development has pressured
many state governments to move away from conservation activities.3
This recent struggle has been particularly acute in the Midwestern
United States, where significant Marcellus and Utica Shale natural
gas deposits have been discovered. Such discoveries have caused
long-dormant property conflicts to surface as individuals and
organizations compete to capitalize on the evolving oil and gas
market.4
Although scholars have written numerous articles discussing
conservation easements, addressing issues ranging from the
appropriate valuation methods for determining IRS deductions5 to
whether conservation easements are an appropriate means of
preserving land,6 they have neglected to discuss the conflicting
1. DAVID J. DIETRICH & CHRISTIAN DIETRICH, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: TAX AND REAL
ESTATE PLANNING FOR LANDOWNERS AND ADVISORS xvii (2011).
2. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Could Coalbed Methane Be the Death of Conservation
Easements?, WYO. LAW., Oct. 2006, at 18.
3. See Michael Scott, Environmentalists Worried that Plan to Sell State Park Could Open
Way for Drilling, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 12, 2011, 5:15 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/
2011/01/environmentalists_worried_that.html.
4. See John Funk, Rural Ohio Is the Wild West as Gas and Oil Companies Compete for
Drilling Rights, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 22, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/business/
index.ssf/2011/10/gas_companies_swarm_in_frackin.html.
5. See James Boyd et al., The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from
an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 234-41 (2000) (explaining
issues in valuing conservation easements).
6. See, e.g., Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End
of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121 (2011) (arguing that perpetual
conservation easements should no longer be used as a conservation tool); see also Jessica E.
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property rights between conservation easements and oil and gas
leases. In fact, the Land Trust Alliance, one of the largest umbrella
organizations for land trusts, is still developing methods to handle
these conflicting rights.7
This Note will focus on both Ohio’s conservation easement law
and oil and gas law in order to develop a robust understanding of
how conservation easements and oil and gas leases conflict. Unlike
other Marcellus and Utica Shale states, Ohio’s oil and gas law is
largely undeveloped.8 The undeveloped nature of Ohio’s oil and gas
law, coupled with its current oil and gas boom, make Ohio an ideal
state to discuss these conflicting property rights.9
First, this Note will establish why conservation easements and oil
and gas leases are likely to conflict. Second, this Note will present
two scenarios under which conservation easements and oil and gas
leases might conflict and then demonstrate how current law sorts
out the conflicting rights. Third, it will advance several arguments
for how conservation easements should be adapted, identifying
specific provisions that should be altered in light of the Internal
Revenue Code and Ohio’s current legal structure. By doing so, this
Note will elucidate how the oil and gas boom in Ohio offers conser-
vation organizations a unique opportunity to preserve land, while
benefiting from the boom themselves. This Note maintains that
conservation easements and oil and gas development can both exist
and thrive, but only if conservation organizations relax their
unitization prohibitions, identify and work around potential
conflicts, and draft their conservation easements to protect against
such conflicts.
Jay, When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, and
Termination of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(outlining the issues conservation easements face due to changing conditions).
7. See Scott Howard & Matt McDonough, Mineral Rights and Land Conservation in the
Midwest , LAND TR. ALLIANCE (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conserva
tion/conservation-defense/conservation-defense-insurance/CDdocuments/Mineral%20and%
20gas%20rights%20extraction%20March202008.pdf.
8. George A. Bibikos & Jeffrey C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the Marcellus
Shale States, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 155, 189 (2009).
9. See Ohio Oil & Gas Activity, OHIO OIL & GAS ASS’N, http://ooga.org/our-industry/ohio-
oil-gas-activity/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) (stating an estimated 625 oil and gas wells in 40
of Ohio’s 88 counties were drilled in 2012, including more than 3.5 million feet of holes).
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I. WHY DO CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND OIL AND GAS LEASES
CONFLICT?
The rights that accompany conservation easements and oil and
gas leases stem from the same conceptual premise but vary
significantly in purpose. In this way, the two property rights might
be thought of as two sides of the same coin. Both are products of
property law,10 and both come from a legal tradition that allows a
property owner to control his property’s destiny with only a few
limiting conditions.11 A property owner can exercise his privilege in
numerous ways, including using the land for conservation purposes
or for mineral development.12 However, the conceptual similarities
end here.
In particular, the interests promoted by conservation easements
can be directly adverse to the interests promoted by oil and gas
leases. In general terms, this conflict can be characterized as
property development versus property preservation. This seemingly
obvious conflict sets the stage for understanding how and why these
interests are adverse to one another. In order to truly appreciate the
conflict, one must first gain a detailed understanding of the laws
governing each interest.
A. Conservation Easements: Purposes, Enforceability & 
Deductibility
A conservation easement is a tool used by conservation organiza-
tions to preserve and conserve land for future generations based on
its natural, scenic, ecological, or historic property value.13 In
particular, a conservation easement “restrict[s] the type and amount
10. See Boyd et al., supra note 5, at 215; see also David E. Pierce, The Impact of
Landowner/Lessor Environmental Risk on Oil and Gas Lessee Rights and Obligations, 31
TULSA L.J. 731, 733-37 (1996) (discussing how multiple ownership of property can increase
risks to the environment).
11. 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 14.02(c) (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2000).
12. See id.
13. Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 2-3 (1989); see also I.R.C. § 170(h)(4) (2006) (stating the four acceptable
“conservation purposes”).
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of development that may take place on [a particular landowner’s]
property” through the use of a legally enforceable agreement.14 In
addition to creating restrictions on the landowner, a conservation
easement also grants an enforceable, nonpossessory property
interest to the easement holder, usually a nonprofit conservation
organization or governmental entity.15 In exchange for granting
such an interest, the landowner usually realizes a tax benefit under
a qualified deduction for a charitable contribution.16
Under the modern understanding, a conservation easement exists
in perpetuity and is fully alienable.17 Although the term conserva-
tion easement implies a traditional understanding of real property
easements, conservation easements could not have existed under
the common law.18 In recognition of this and in order to promote
land preservation, every state has passed a conservation easement
enabling statute that overcomes the common law impediments and
incorporates the requirements for a qualified charitable contribution
under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).19 Thus, conservation
easements are creatures of the common law, state statutory law,
and federal tax law.20 This unique background raises an array of
issues that require discussion beyond the scope of this Note.
However, a brief overview of the legal background that allows
conservation easements to exist will help elucidate how and why
conservation easements conflict with oil and gas leases.
1. Common Law Negative Easements
Under the common law, a conservation easement would be
considered a negative easement in gross, and as such, would be
14. JANET DIEHL & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK:
MANAGING LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENT PROGRAMS 5 (1988).
15. See id. For a lengthy discussion on the “bundle of rights” concept in property law, see
generally J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711
(1996).
16. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii).
17. See Dana & Ramsey, supra note 13, at 21-27.
18. DIETRICH & DIETRICH, supra note 1, at xix.
19. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 19 (“All fifty states and the District of Columbia have
enacted easement enabling legislation.”). For a discussion of IRC regulations, see infra Part
I.A.3.
20. See DIETRICH & DIETRICH, supra note 1, at xviii.
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unenforceable.21 Such a characterization comes from the fact that a
conservation easement places negative restrictions, or prohibitions,
on the type and magnitude of development on a landowner’s
property.22 The common law recognized only four kinds of negative
easements: prohibitions on blocking sunlight; prohibitions on
blocking air movement; prohibitions against removing subjacent or
lateral support from adjacent properties; and prohibitions against
interfering with the flow of artificially created streams.23 Because
conservation easements do not neatly fit into any of these catego-
ries, the common law would have held them unenforceable.24
In addition to the narrow categories of negative easements
recognized by the common law, courts greatly disfavored easements
in gross, particularly negative easements in gross.25 Specifically, the
way in which property transfers were recorded made tracking the
assignment, termination, or disposition of easements in gross
extremely difficult.26 The difficulty comes from the fact that an
easement in gross does not benefit a particular appurtenant parcel
of land;27 therefore, the easement would not be identifiable through
the real property recordation process.28 Because easements in gross
21. An easement in gross is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a]n easement
benefiting a particular person and not a particular piece of land. The beneficiary need not, and
usu[ally] does not, own any land adjoining the servient estate.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th
ed. 2009). Additionally, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a negative easement as “[a]n easement
that prohibits the servient-estate owner from doing something, such as building an
obstruction.” Id. Thus, a negative easement in gross benefits a particular person and restricts
the servient-estate owner’s ability to do certain things. In the case of a conservation easement,
the servient-estate owner is usually prohibited from developing the property. As an aside,
even if conservation easements were considered common law restrictive covenants or
equitable servitudes, they would still be unenforceable under the common law. See DIETRICH
& DIETRICH, supra note 1, at xxi-xxii; Dana & Ramsey, supra note 13, at 15-17.
22. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 13, at 15-17.
23. DIETRICH & DIETRICH, supra note 1, at xix; Dana & Ramsey, supra note 13, at 13.
24. See also DIETRICH & DIETRICH, supra note 1, at xix; Dana & Ramsey, supra note 13,
at 13.
25. See, e.g., Fruth Farms v. Vill. of Holgate, 442 F. Supp. 2d 470, 475-76 (N.D. Ohio 2006)
(noting that the common law and current Ohio law disfavor easements in gross);  Merrill
Lynch Mortg. Lending, Inc. v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 2010-Ohio-1827, at *13-14 (Ohio
Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2010).
26. See Lara Womack Daniel & James D. Timmons, Conservation Easements and Eminent
Domain at the Intersection; How Modern Legal Creations Meet Constitutional Principles, 36
REAL EST. L.J. 433, 434-35 (2008).
27. Id. at 434.
28. See Owley, supra note 6, at 145.
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could not be tracked, the common law did not allow them to be
alienable or to perpetually exist.29
2. Ohio’s Enabling Statute
In order to overcome the impediments the common law presented,
all states and the District of Columbia have passed some form of a
conservation easement enabling statute.30 Nearly all enabling
statutes are based on the Uniform Conservation Easement Act
(UCEA), which was promulgated in 1981 and explicitly validates
conservation easements.31 Ohio’s enabling statute is substantially
similar to the UCEA.32 Like the UCEA, Ohio’s enabling statute
overcomes the common law impediments by explicitly removing the
common law restrictions on negative easements in gross.33
In addition to removing the common law impediments, Ohio’s
enabling statute incorporates elements of the IRC. This allows
landowners to more easily take advantage of charitable tax
deductions when donating their conservation easements to conser-
vation organizations. Specifically, Ohio’s enabling statute authorizes
only certain entities to hold conservation easements, limiting
holders to only those that meet the requirements of “qualified
organizations” under the IRC.34 Ohio’s enabling statute also
embodies the IRC’s definitions of conservation purposes.35 By
29. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 13, at 14.
30. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements,
29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 426 (2005).
31. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 165 (2008); McLaughlin, supra note
30, at 426.
32. Compare UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 165, with OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 5301.67-70 (West 2013) (promulgating substantially similar legislation as to
easements).
33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.70 (“Conservation easements are not unenforceable for
lack of privity of contract or estate or lack of benefit to a particular dominant estate.
Conservation easements are assignable to another entity authorized to hold conservation
easements.”).
34. Ohio enables nonprofit organizations as defined in 501(c) of the IRS Code, municipal
corporations, and park districts, among others to be holders of conservation easements. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.69; see also I.R.C. § 170(h)(3) (2006) (defining “qualified organ-
izations”).
35. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.67(A) (“ ‘Conservation easement’ means an incorporeal
right or interest in land that is held for the public purpose of retaining land, water, or wetland
areas predominantly in their natural, scenic, open, or wooded condition ... or retaining their
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overcoming the impediments of the common law and incorporating
many of the IRC’s definitions, Ohio’s enabling statute allows
landowners and conservation organizations to mutually benefit from
the donation of a conservation easement.
3. Internal Revenue Code Requirements
a. Applicable Definitions
In order for a landowner to realize a tax benefit from the donation
of a conservation easement, the donation must meet the require-
ments of the IRC and extensive Treasury Regulations
(Regulations).36 A conservation easement will qualify as a tax
deduction only if four criteria are met: (1) the contribution is of a
“qualified real property interest”; (2) the contribution is made to a
“qualified organization”; (3) the contribution is exclusively for
“conservation purposes”; and (4) the conservation purposes of the
gift are protected in perpetuity.37
For the purposes of this Note, only certain definitions are of
import because only specific elements of a conservation easement
are likely to conflict with oil and gas lease provisions. These
elements include the definition of a “qualified real property interest”
and “conservation purposes.” The IRC defines a qualified real
property interest as the entire interest of the donor other than a
qualified mineral interest.38 Additionally, the IRC identifies four
categories that qualify as conservation purposes: (1) the preserva-
tion of land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the
general public; (2) the protection of a significant, relatively natural
habitat for fish, wildlife, or plants; (3) the preservation of certain
open space (including farm land and forest land) pursuant to a
use predominantly as suitable habitat for fish, plants, or wildlife; that imposes any limitations
on the use or development of the areas that are appropriate at the time of creation of the
conservation easement to achieve one or more of those purposes; and that includes
appropriate provisions for the holder to enter the property subject to the easement at
reasonable times to ensure compliance with its provisions.”).
36. See I.R.C. § 170(h); 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14 (2009); C. Timothy Lindstrom, A Guide to
the Tax Aspects of Conservation Easement Contributions, 7 WYO. L. REV. 441, 446-47 (2007).
37. I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)-(4).
38. Id. § 170(h)(2).
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“clearly delineated” governmental conservation policy, or for scenic
purposes, resulting in a significant public benefit; or (4) the
preservation of an historically important land area or certified
historic structure.39
b. The Effect of Deductibility on Mineral Extraction
In addition to creating categories of conservation purposes, the
IRC also places restrictions on mineral extraction from qualifying
conservation easement properties. Most critically, the IRC prohibits
the use of any surface mining technique to extract any mineral from
a protected property when the mineral interest has not been severed
prior to the grant of a conservation easement.40 While this seem-
ingly protects properties covered under conservation easements
from mineral extraction, many properties in Ohio have previously-
severed mineral estates.41 In those instances, a different set of rules
applies.
In the event that the mineral interest has been severed prior to
granting a conservation easement, the donated conservation
easement will be deductible only “if the probability of surface
mining occurring on such property is so remote as to be negligible.”42
This section restricts conservation organizations and landowners
from creating qualified, deductible conservation easements on land
with a severed mineral estate because the organization must
undertake the near-impossible task of ensuring the land will not be
mined without having the legal authority to control the mineral
estate’s destiny. Thus, the restriction causes a chilling effect on a
conservation organization’s ability to accept properties with severed
mineral estates because doing so substantially risks nondeduct-
ibility of the grant.43
39. Id. § 170(h)(4)(A).
40. Id. § 170(h)(5)(B).
41. OSBA NATURAL RES. COMM., Natural Resources, OHIO ST. BAR ASS’N, http://ohiobar.
org/ForLawyers/Legislative/Pages/staticpage-643.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). Ohio’s oil
and gas development goes back to the mid-1800s. Id.; see also Laura H. Burney, A Pragmatic
Approach to Decision Making in the Next Era of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 4-5 (1996).
42. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(B)(ii). 
43. See supra Part I.A.2.
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To add yet another layer of rules, if the landowner donates the
qualified mineral interest itself, the law allows extraction so long as
the surface impact is not inconsistent with the conservation
purposes.44 Regulators have interpreted this regulation as allowing
subsurface mineral extraction where the impact is merely “limited
and localized” and is not “irremediably destructive of significant
conservation interests.”45 By applying this interpretation, a
landowner could place a conservation easement on his property and
legally extract minerals through unitization and the use of horizon-
tal drilling techniques. Thus, the landowner would get the best of
both worlds, benefiting from a tax deduction from the conservation
easement and receiving royalties under a unitization agreement.46
Unfortunately, many conservation easements are more restrictive
than the IRC because they explicitly prohibit unitization.47
The federal tax structure creates a system that is flexible enough
to allow mineral extraction under certain conditions, while still
encouraging conservation efforts. Moreover, the IRC’s allowance of
a deduction and subsurface extraction is particularly important
when discussing how conservation organizations can adapt to Ohio’s
oil and gas boom. Namely, the IRC allows landowners to unitize
their oil and gas interests while also granting a conservation
easement on the surface estate.48
B. Oil and Gas Leases
Ohio’s oil and gas law is largely undeveloped, making it an ideal
candidate for analyzing conflicting property rights between
conservation easements and oil and gas leases. As a starting point,
Ohio case law holds that oil and gas leases convey both a contrac-
tual right to remove oil and gas from the property and a limited
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g) (2009).
45. Id. 
46. Unitization is the bringing together of small tracts of land that would not be
economical to individually extract. See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL
OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1039-40 (7th ed. 1987).
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. See infra Part III.
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property right.49 Because oil and gas leases are based in both
contract and property law, Ohio courts have held that the contract
governs the parties’ obligations, supplemented by implied rights
from property law.50
Ohio common law grants a lessee of an oil and gas lease numer-
ous implied property rights that go beyond the provisions of the
lease.51 These implied property rights include, among many others,
the right to reasonable surface use and the right to protect the
mineral estate from drainage.52
As the default rule, Ohio’s common law follows the majority of
states by favoring development of the mineral estate over the
interests of the surface estate.53 From this default position, the
implied rights held by oil and gas lessees erode the interests of the
surface estate owner54 and can even overcome a surface estate that
is seemingly protected by a conservation easement.55 In order to
understand how a conservation easement can be subordinate to a
mineral estate interest, one first must understand the default
position and how it impacts the mineral estate’s implied interests.
49. “An oil and gas lease also creates a limited property right, such that the lessee has the
right to possess the land to the extent reasonably necessary to perform the terms of the lease
on his part.” Maverick Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Barberton City Sch. Dist., 872 N.E.2d
322, 327 (Ohio 2007) (citing Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502, 506 (Ohio 1897)); see also
Quarto Mining Co. v. Litman, 326 N.E.2d 676, 684-85 (Ohio 1975); Pure Oil Co. v. Kindall,
156 N.E. 119, 123 (Ohio 1927); Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502, 506 (Ohio 1897).
50. See Litman, 326 N.E.2d at 683-85; see also Gloria L. Scott, Development Obligations
of the Oil and Gas Lessee, 13 ST. MARY’S L.J. 846, 847 (1982).
51. See Charles E. Frost, Jr., Implied Covenants and the Duty to Develop in Underground
Coal Gasification, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1981) (“Almost all jurisdictions imply covenants
for ... oil and gas leases.”).
52. Id. at 1305 n.13. Although Ohio has granted mineral rights holders many implied
rights, including the right to reasonable surface use, it has curtailed the rights in some
instances. See Skivolocki v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 313 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ohio 1974) (“[T]he right to
strip mine is not incident to ownership of a mineral estate.”).
53. For a summary of oil and gas law, see generally JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN
A NUTSHELL (4th ed. 2003).
54. See Carroll G. Martin, Yours, Mine, and Ours: Conflicts Between Mineral and Surface
Estates, 46 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 19-1, 19-3 (2000).
55. See infra Part II for a discussion of when a conservation easement will protect the
surface estate from the implied rights of the mineral estate.
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1. Ohio’s Common Law Rule
Ohio’s common law favors development of mineral interests
because extraction of minerals has been and continues to be
considered a public good supported by strong public policy.56
Because public policy favors extraction, mineral estates are
dominant estates, and surface estates are servient estates.57 In
other words, a mineral estate’s interests override the conflicting
interests of the surface estate because the surface estate is servient
to the dominant mineral estate. This right even extends to allow the
mineral estate holder to damage the surface estate without
compensation, so long as the mineral estate holder is only using a
reasonably necessary portion of the surface and the damage occurs
during an extraction-related activity.58
Ohio generally has followed the common law rule of mineral
estate dominance over a conflicting surface estate.59 Recently,
however, the Ohio courts have slightly relaxed the rule through
judicial interpretation of lease contracts.60 Nonetheless, Ohio’s
common law still strongly favors mineral extraction over conflicting
surface rights.61 Upon this background, Ohio’s common law affords
little protection to conservation easements from potential mineral
extraction, further placing conservation organizations on a precari-
ous footing to fend off the oil and gas boom.
56. See LoValerie Mullins, The Equity Illusion of Surface Ownership in Coalbed Methane
Gas; The Rise of Mutual Simultaneous Rights in Mineral Law and the Resulting Need for
Dispute Resolution in Split Estate Relations, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 142-43
(2009).
57. Ronald W. Polston, Surface Rights of Mineral Owners—What Happens When Judges
Make Law and Nobody Listens?, 63 N.D. L. REV. 41, 42-44 (1987).
58. Id. at 42-43.
59. See Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., 80 N.E. 6, 8 (Ohio 1907); see also Realty Title &
Inv. Co. v. Fairport, Painesville & E. Rd. Co., 12 Ohio App. 73, 79, 82 (1919); Chartiers Oil Co.
v. Curtiss, 24 Ohio C.D. 106, 111-12 (1911), aff ’d, 106 N.E. 1053 (Ohio 1913).
60. For example, Ohio courts have held that strip mining is not a right incident to a
mineral lease. See Skivolocki v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 313 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ohio 1974).
61. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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2. Implied Easement to Reasonable Use of Surface
Arguably the most important implied right for the mineral estate
holder is the right to make reasonable use of the surface estate.
Consequently, reasonable use is also the implied right that most
often conflicts with the purposes of a conservation easement.62
Courts established the right to reasonable surface use out of
necessity in order to give the mineral estate holder access to his
bargained-for interest.63 In this way, the implied right to reasonable
surface use can be considered an appurtenant easement.64 While
state courts have interpreted the right to reasonable surface use
differently, Ohio courts hold that reasonable surface use is a
question of fact that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.65
Nonetheless, the cases establish several key requirements. First,
the mineral estate holder cannot use more land than is necessary to
extract the mineral from the ground, unless the lease expressly
grants the mineral estate holder such a right.66 Second, the mineral
estate holder cannot destroy the surface when its destruction would
be totally incompatible with the surface owner’s use and enjoyment
of his land.67 While these two limitations exist, Ohio courts are
reluctant to invoke them and instead continue to favor the mineral
estate over the surface estate.68 Again, Ohio’s application of the
common law weakens the protection offered by conservation
easements against mineral extraction.
3. Right to Protect Mineral Estate from Drainage
In addition to the implied right of reasonable surface use, mineral
estate holders are also granted the right to protect their mineral
62. See infra Parts II-III.
63. Polston, supra note 57, at 44.
64. Id.
65. Snyder v. Dep’t Natural Res., 985 N.E.2d 168, 175 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).
66. See Quarto Mining Co. v. Litman, 326 N.E.2d 676, 684-85 (Ohio 1975).
67. Skivolocki v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 313 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ohio 1974) (holding that strip
mining is totally incompatible with the surface owner’s interest in use and enjoyment of his
land). Most critically for conservation easements, this case law might allow a conservation
easement to prevent extraction in extreme circumstances where extraction would completely
destroy the conservation purposes of the easement.
68. See Snyder, 985 N.E.2d at 173-74.
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interests from drainage.69 Ohio courts have recognized this right for
many years.70 Additionally, the Ohio legislature codified and
expanded the common law right in a recently passed oil and gas
conservation statute.71 The statute reinvigorates the right to protect
from drainage by creating a new governing agency for regulating oil
and gas production—the Ohio Division of Oil and Gas Resources
Management.72 This agency promulgates and updates the regula-
tions that govern oil and gas production, including the number,
placement, spacing, and minimum acreage requirements of well
sites.73 These regulations help ensure the efficient extraction of
Ohio’s oil and gas resources. The agency’s regulations have greatly
diminished the need for a robust common law right to protect from
drainage, but also have created additional potential for conflicts
between oil and gas leases and conservation easements, particularly
under Ohio’s forced pooling/unitization statute.74
“Unitization” or “pooling” is a term used to describe the bringing
together of small tracts of land that individually would be insuffi-
cient to meet minimum acreage and well spacing regulations.75 The
coalescing of small tracts is necessary to ensure that oil and gas can
be economically developed on the properties.76 Moreover, unitization
eliminates wasteful expenditures by minimizing the number of wells
that need to be drilled to drain a particular area of land.77 Unitiza-
tion and pooling provisions come in two varieties: voluntary
unitization and involuntary or forced unitization.78 The latter of
these two varieties presents a significant barrier to conservation
organizations attempting to convince landowners to donate
69. Frost, supra note 51, at 1305 n.13.
70. Bucher v. Plymouth Oil & Gas Co., 140 N.E. 940, 941 (Ohio 1923); Williams v. Samuel
J. Brendel Oil & Gas, Inc., 24 Ohio Law Abs. 525, 526-27 (Ct. App. 1937).
71. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West 2013).
72. Id.
73. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02, .21, .24.
74. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-04 (2013) (outlining the administration of the oil and
natural gas conservation program in Ohio); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.25-.29 (establishing
the criteria for unitization of property into drilling units); id. § 1509.24 (establishing
minimum acreage requirements and minimum well distances).
75. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 46, at 1039-40.
76. Id.
77. Id. 
78. Ralph B. Shank, Pooling Problems, 28 TEX. L. REV. 662, 662, 670 (1950).
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conservation easements, especially when a conservation easement
prohibits voluntary unitization.79
Ohio expressly permits forced unitization by statute.80 Ohio’s
forced unitization provision is intended to stop landowners from
holding out and preventing the economical extraction of oil and gas,
and to overcome free rider issues.81 In Ohio, forced unitization can
be accomplished through application to the Division of Oil and Gas
Resources Management after the mineral estate holder has
attempted and failed to enter into a voluntary unitization agree-
ment with the holdout owner on a “just and equitable basis.”82 Upon
meeting the additional criteria established in the statute, the
Division of Oil and Gas Resource Management will unitize the
involuntary mineral holder’s interest.83 The statute also penalizes
the involuntary mineral holder by forcing the holder to pay a risk-
penalty.84 The threat of forced unitization will be discussed later in
this Note because it poses a significant threat to conservation
easements, while voluntary unitization presents a significant
opportunity for conservation organizations.85
II. THE PROBLEM
Some scholars have argued that the current law, which favors oil
and gas development over conservation, should be altered.86
Contrary to such propositions, this Note contends that legal changes
are unwarranted because the current laws strike the appropriate
balance between mineral development and conservation interests by
encouraging avoidance of conflict and placing the burden of
avoidance on those who are in the best position to do so. Addition-
ally, the law provides conservation organizations with significant
79. If a conservation easement prohibits surface owners from entering into voluntary
unitization agreements, many landowners will forgo granting a conservation easement in
order to preserve their right to unitize their property and receive royalty payments.
80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (West 2013).
81. Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: State Options in Dealing with
Uncooperative Owners, 7 J. ENERGY L. POL’Y 255, 256-57 (1986).
82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See infra Part III.
86. See Pierce, supra note 10, at 751.
2014] CONFLICTING PROPERTY RIGHTS 1603
legal solutions to have severed mineral estates declared abandoned
and vested in the surface estate, thus reuniting the mineral estate
with the surface estate.87 While current law should be maintained,
the oil and gas boom in Ohio admittedly presents significant
barriers to conservation easements.
In order to overcome these barriers, conservation organizations
should alter their conservation easement language and take a
proactive approach in assessing potential conservation easement
properties. In particular, conservation organizations should identify
potential conflicts before accepting any conservation easement and
draft their conservation easements to protect against such conflicts.
If the conservation organizations find any conflicts, they should
attempt to have the mineral estate deemed abandoned and vested
in the surface estate pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 5301.56. If
the conflict cannot be resolved, conservation organizations should
avoid the property and seek alternative properties. This Note will
demonstrate that conservation organizations in Ohio have been
presented with a unique opportunity to preserve land while
benefiting from the oil and gas boom themselves. The two scenarios
below will elucidate the difficult position Ohio’s conservation
organizations have been placed in and will demonstrate how these
organizations might use the oil and gas boom and Ohio’s current
legal structure to their advantage.
A. Scenario One: Unsevered Mineral Estate
Conservation organizations are encouraged to accept conservation
easements from properties with unsevered mineral estates.88
Unsevered mineral estates greatly reduce the risk of future conflicts
between a conservation easement and an oil and gas lease because
the owner of the property controls the fate of both the surface and
mineral estate.89 Therefore, when a conservation easement is placed
on a property with an unsevered mineral estate, the conservation
organization will know that oil and gas development will not occur
87. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56 (West 2013) (creating a notification requirement
to have a severed mineral estate vest in the surface owner).
88. See Howard & McDonough, supra note 7.
89. See id. 
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on the property or, at a minimum, will have legal recourse against
the surface owner for breach of the conservation easement.90 While
unsevered mineral estates are ideal for a conservation organization
because they reduce the potential for future conflicts, the current oil
and gas boom likely will present major hurdles for getting landown-
ers to donate their land.
The most significant hurdle is that oil and gas leases will become
even more enticing for landowners due to the great potential for
massive royalty payments.91 When making the decision whether to
donate property, a landowner of an unsevered mineral estate must
choose between donating a conservation easement and receiving a
tax benefit or leasing his property to a mineral developer and receiv-
ing lease payments and potentially substantial royalty payments.
This choice is forced on the landowner by the IRC regulations that
require a complete prohibition on surface mining in order to qualify
for a deduction and the unitization prohibitions found in most
conservation easements.92 Because of Ohio’s current law and the
language of conservation easements, oil and gas leases and conser-
vation easements are in direct competition for landowners. In Ohio,
where the presumption is in favor of extracting minerals and other
resources, many landowners likely have found the potential profits
from oil and gas leases too enticing and may have turned away from
conservation organizations.93 The mutually exclusive options forced
on Ohio’s landowners necessitate that conservation organizations
adapt by making their conservation easements more appealing to
landowners.94 This change can occur only if conservation organiza-
tions embrace the oil and gas boom.
B. Scenario Two: Severed Mineral Estate
Because conservation easements and oil and gas leases are both
created through contractual relationships that can span across time
90. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
91. Presumably not all large tract landowners are environmentally or conservation
minded. Therefore, the enticement of large amounts of money may be enough to turn away
at least some landowners from conservation easements.
92. See supra Part I.
93. Howard & McDonough, supra note 7.
94. See infra Part III.
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and ownership, disputes between these conflicting interests
typically occur on properties where the mineral rights have been
severed.95 Such disputes place conservation organizations in a
precarious situation because the severed mineral estate is favored
over the surface estate or, in other words, the conservation ease-
ment.96 Therefore, if the conservation organization does not obtain
a subordination97 or forfeiture98 and abandonment99 of the conflict-
ing mineral estate, the conservation easement risks becoming void
and unenforceable.100 Because of that risk, conservation organiza-
tions are encouraged to avoid severed mineral estates.101
III. CONSERVATION EASEMENT LANGUAGE
As demonstrated by the previous two scenarios, conservation
organizations are placed in a difficult situation by oil and gas
development in Ohio. They can accept donations only from proper-
ties with unsevered mineral estates, accept donations only from
properties with severed mineral estates, or accept both types of
properties. If the organizations choose the first option, they risk
alienating landowners who may want to preserve their land, but do
not want to forego the monetary benefits of mineral development. If
the organizations choose the second option, they risk having their
conservation easements invalidated by competing oil and gas leases,
which they have no control over.102 If the conservation organizations
choose the third option, they risk both alienating landowners and
having invalidated conservation easements.
95. Martin, supra note 54, at 19-3; Guy L. Nevill, Multiple Uses and Conflicting Rights,
13 ST. MARY’S L.J. 783, 785-90 (1982).
96. See supra Part I.B.
97. Subordination agreements can be obtained only through agreement with the mineral
estate holders. See Howard & McDonough, supra note 7.
98. Forfeiture of a mineral estate can be done by following Ohio’s oil and gas lease
forfeiture process. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.332 (West 2013).
99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56.
100. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
102. This assumes that conservation organizations are unable to subordinate or cause a
forfeiture and abandonment of the mineral interest—both of which can be cumbersome and
difficult processes. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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A. Why Attempts to Change Current Law Should Be Abandoned
One approach to solving the dilemma could be to alter current law
so that it no longer favors oil and gas leases over conservation
easements. Such a change to the underlying legal framework would
allow conservation organizations to pursue properties with severed
mineral estates without risking invalidation. However, changing the
current law would be a monumental task and would lead to an
inefficient result.
First, changing the current law would be an enormous undertak-
ing. The law has favored oil and gas leases over surface estates for
hundreds of years, and legislative inertia is difficult to overcome.
This is especially true because the Ohio legislature has been
working to encourage Ohio’s oil and gas development.103 Therefore,
lobbying efforts by conservation organizations are likely to fall on
deaf ears in the Ohio legislature. Even if conservation organizations
might be able to muster some sympathy in the Ohio legislature,
passing such a significant reform likely would take substantial
time—time that conservation organizations do not have to spare.
Every day more oil and gas leases are entered into in Ohio, making
it difficult for conservation organizations to wait for the legislative
process to work in their favor.104
Second, current law is efficient because it places the burden of
avoidance on the entity in the best position to avoid the conflict and
offers legal processes to conservation organizations to protect their
conservation easements.105 Current law encourages conservation
organizations and oil and gas companies to assess the title of the
property by penalizing the entity that fails to do so.106 Avoiding
conflict is important because of the high costs of arbitration and
103. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 309, 344-45 (1995); see also Joe Guillen, Ohio Senate Approves Bill to Allow Oil and
Gas Drilling at State Parks, CLEVELAND.COM (June 15, 2011), http://www.cleveland.com/open/
index.ssf/2011/06/ohio_senate_approves_bill_to_a.html.
104. For the number of oil and gas permits and wells drilled in Ohio, see Shale Well
Drilling & Permitting, ODNR DIV. OIL & GAS RESOURCES, http://oilandgas.ohiodnr.gov/shale
(last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
105. This assumes adequate foresight, due diligence, and legal maneuvering pursuant to
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.332 and 5301.56.
106.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 29.45.062 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-
30.2-109 (West 2013).
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litigation.107 Current law disfavors later-arriving entities if they
attempt to use the property in a way that is inconsistent with its
previous uses.108
For example, if a property has an oil and gas lease, current law
encourages the conservation organization to search the property’s
title and discern whether the mineral rights have been severed.109
Because the law will favor oil and gas leases over conservation
easements, the conservation organization knows to either avoid the
properties with oil and gas leases or attempt to get a subordination
or forfeiture and abandonment of the mineral rights.110
The law would reach an unfair and inefficient result if it penal-
ized the prior estate holder—who has done nothing wrong—merely
because a later-coming entity failed to search the property records
and assess the burdens currently on the property. Moreover, later-
arriving entities are in the best position to avoid the conflict because
they can easily discover the current state of title. Because the
current law favors firstcomers, it is efficient. For that reason alone,
it should not be altered.
B. How Conservation Organizations Should Change Their  
Conservation Easement Language
A more realistic approach to solving the problem would involve
conservation organizations altering their conservation easement
language. This approach is realistic in the sense that the actual
terms of a conservation easement are created by agreement between
the conservation organization and the landowner.111 Therefore,
conservation organizations could unilaterally adopt new easement
language for prospective easements and negotiate with current
landowners for existing easements.112 There are several provisions
107. Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2006) (comparing litigation to investment
projects).
108. See DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 14, at 122 (enforcing a strict policy for amend-
ments).
109. See supra note 106.
110. See supra Part II.
111. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 65-66 (2003).
112. See id. 
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that conservation organizations should alter in their conservation
easements in order to make them more appealing to landowners of
unsevered estates and, therefore, more competitive against oil and
gas leases.113
1. No-Inconsistent Use Clause
The key provision that conservation organizations should alter is
the no-inconsistent use clause. A no-inconsistent use clause is a
critical provision in any conservation easement because it prohibits
the landowner from using his property in a way that is inconsistent
with the conservation purposes of the easement.114 To establish
inconsistent activities, conservation organizations will create a
baseline report of the property, outlining the existing conditions and
uses before the easement goes into effect.115 Preexisting conditions
and preexisting uses of the property will typically be allowed to
continue after the easement is granted, so long as they do not
conflict with the conservation purposes.116 For example, if a walking
path exists at the time the conservation easement is granted, its
existence and use will be allowed to continue so long as the path is
not expanded and does not otherwise conflict with the conservation
purposes. Thus, a no-inconsistent use clause, along with an accom-
panying baseline report, is the main tool to determine whether the
conservation easement has been violated.
For example, a conservation easement that is donated under the
conservation purpose of preserving the ecological and scenic
integrity of the property will prohibit the landowner from destroying
those aspects of his property. The no-inconsistent use clause, in this
instance, would explicitly prohibit the landowner from developing
the property, constructing buildings that would impair scenic
enjoyment, altering any waterways that traverse the property, and
destroying vegetation, trees, or animals.117 More pertinent to this
113. By doing so, the conservation easement still will be legally binding because it will
meet the requirements of both the enabling statute and IRC. See supra Part II.A.
114. DIETRICH & DIETRICH, supra note 1, at 15-16.
115. DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 14, at 71-72.
116. See id. at 6.
117. Notice that these uses all pertain to the surface of the property. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
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Note, conservation easements typically prohibit any mineral
development on the property, both surface and subsurface.118 While
the surface restriction is required in order to qualify for a tax
deduction, the subsurface restriction is not.119 Therefore, current
conservation easement language is overly restrictive on landowners
to the conservation organization’s detriment.120
Conservation organizations should alter this prohibition in order
to allow the landowner to extract minerals through subsurface
extraction techniques. In particular, the no-inconsistent use clause
should expressly allow a landowner to voluntarily unitize his
property. Such a change would allow the landowner to preserve his
land with a conservation easement and benefit from the monetary
gains of an oil and gas lease. Moreover, allowing voluntary unitiza-
tion would also protect the landowner from Ohio’s punitive, forced
unitization statute.121 Hydraulic fracturing techniques coupled with
horizontal drilling techniques have made subsurface extraction
much easier and significantly more profitable.122 In fact, subsurface
extraction can have a pay zone over fifty times larger than tradi-
tional vertical well extraction techniques.123 Not only is the pay zone
larger, but horizontal drilling techniques also allow large areas of
oil and gas extraction while minimizing surface impacts.124
Additionally, as part of the no-inconsistent use language, a
conservation organization should include a requirement that the
landowner pay the conservation organization a percentage of the
royalties that come from the oil and gas extraction. Altering the no-
inconsistent use clause would make conservation easements more
attractive to landowners and supply the conservation organization
with a consistent and potentially large funding source.
118.  DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 14, at 188-89; DIETRICH & DIETRICH, supra note 1, at
66; Howard & McDonough, supra note 7.
119. See supra Part I.A.3.b.
120. Thus, prohibitions against voluntary unitization are more restrictive than the
requirements under the IRC. See C. Timothy Lindstrom, Income Tax Aspects of Conservation
Easements, 5 WYO. L. REV. 1, 24-28 (2005).
121. See supra Part I.B.3.
122. See Terry W. Roberson, Environmental Concerns of Hydraulically Fracturing a
Natural Gas Well, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 67, 71 (2012).
123. Id. at 72-73.
124. See id. 
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2. Stricter Monitoring and Enforcement Clauses
While conservation organizations should be lenient in allowing
landowners to voluntarily unitize their unsevered properties,
conservation organizations must simultaneously strengthen their
monitoring and enforcement provisions. A monitoring and enforce-
ment clause places obligations on the conservation organization to
monitor the property and ensure that the terms of the easement are
being met.125 Although the obligation for monitoring and enforce-
ment is placed on the conservation organization, it is the responsi-
bility of the landowner to pay for and remedy violations.126 By
allowing landowners to voluntarily unitize their properties, conser-
vation organizations certainly increase the risks to the property’s
surface, either from unintended gas or chemical releases or from
merely allowing oil and gas operators onto the property.127 Usually,
conservation organizations monitor property for violations only once
a year;128 however, with the increased risks of oil and gas extraction,
organizations should require property to be monitored more often.
While this will cost conservation organizations more time and
resources, requiring the landowners to pay organizations a percent-
age of the royalties from mineral development could alleviate the
increased costs of monitoring.129
In addition, the monitoring and enforcement clause should
require immediate notification upon any suspected surface distur-
bance and place the burden of notification on the landowner. Upon
being notified of a violation, a conservation organization may take
several different paths of enforcement. 
The easement holder might take an informal approach by
notifying the landowner of the violation and requesting that the
violation be remedied.130 If the landowner fails to comply with the
request, the conservation organization may force the landowner into
mandatory arbitration or mediation proceedings.131 Most conserva-
125. DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 14, at 87.
126. Id. at 88, 92.
127. Roberson, supra note 122, at 68, 127.
128. DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 14, at 88, 105.
129. See supra Part I.A.3.b.
130. DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 14, at 91-92.
131. Id. at 92-93.
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tion easements require arbitration or mediation as a way of avoiding
costly litigation. If the arbitration fails to force the landowner to
comply with the easement, the conservation organization can seek
judicial intervention through litigation.132
Conservation organizations should try to avoid litigation, how-
ever, because it is extremely costly and can negatively affect the
organization’s public image.133 If landowners believe they will be
sued over even minor infractions, they will be less likely to donate
a conservation easement.134 Therefore, conservation organizations
should work hard to avoid litigation in most instances by approach-
ing violations through less formal methods.
Finally, the monitoring and enforcement clause should include
strict penalties if the landowner fails to immediately notify the
conservation organization upon a suspected surface impact. The
penalties will help the conservation organization avoid litigation,
while giving their requests for landowner compliance some teeth.
Moreover, the organization can use the financial gains from the
penalties to fund further conservation efforts.
3. Amendment Procedures to Retroactively Apply to Old
Easements
In order for a conservation organization to be equitable to all of
its landowner partners, the organization should amend its old
easements to reflect the lenient no-inconsistent use provision.135
Older conservation easements will typically have a provision that
allows the terms of the easement to be amended under certain
circumstances.136 The amendment process is critical to ensure a
positive relationship between the landowner and the conservation
organization, but it can also present risks to the conservation
organization and to the easement itself.137 The process usually
132. Id. at 92.
133. Conservation organizations must be ever cognizant of how the public views their work.
See infra Part IV.B.
134. See DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 14, at 92 (discussing the high costs and risks of
litigation to both parties).
135. See supra Part III.B.1.
136. DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 14, at 123.
137. DIETRICH & DIETRICH, supra note 1, at 158-59, 169-70.
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occurs when a landowner wants to use his land in a way that is
prohibited by the conservation easement but will not substantially
affect the conservation purposes or value of the conservation
easement.138 In fact, the conservation organization should accept an
amendment only if the change will have a neutral or beneficial
effect on the conservation purposes.139 Amending a conservation
easement can be a tricky and dangerous endeavor because the
landowner may have additional tax liability if the value of the
conservation easement substantially changes, or the easement could
be considered void for failing to meet the requirements of the state
enabling statute.140
The amendment to allow landowners to voluntarily unitize their
property and have subsurface extraction of the mineral estate would
not substantially impact the conservation purposes of any easement
because the surface conditions on the property would not be impact-
ed.141 Moreover, the conservation organization’s increased monitor-
ing should allow for quick detection of violations and, therefore,
quick remedies from the landowner.142 In addition, the increased
revenues from percentage royalty payments from landowners who
have voluntarily unitized will provide funds for the conservation
organization to expand and protect more land. In this way, amend-
ing previous conservation easements to allow voluntary unitization
will have a neutral or improving effect on the conservation purposes
of the organization as a whole.
IV. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL CONCERNS
Although allowing unitization and subsurface extraction will
likely benefit both conservation organizations and landowners, con-
servation organizations have resisted this change due to concerns
138. DIEHL & BARRETT, supra note 14, at 121-22.
139. Id.
140. If the amendment substantially diminishes the value of the conservation easement,
or harms the conservation purposes, the landowner might be required to pay the IRS the
amount of his deduction, including penalties and fees.
141. See generally Kevin J. Smith, Surface Mining and the Continuing Battle Between
Surface and Subsurface Property Owners: A Look at South Dakota Mining Association v.
Lawrence County, 15 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 10 (2000) (prohibiting surface mining,
but not subsurface mining after considering the potential surface impacts of both).
142. See supra Part III.B.2.
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over unintended surface damage and maintaining a positive public
image for funding purposes. Admittedly, some of these concerns may
be justified, but the gains from allowing unitization outweigh the
risks, especially if the conservation organization will not bear the
risks.
A. Risk of Surface Damage from Horizontal Drilling and
Fracturing Mining Techniques
Many of Ohio’s conservation organizations have expressed
concerns about the safety of horizontal drilling and fracturing
techniques.143 In particular, conservation organizations are con-
cerned that allowing unitization would create an unnecessary risk
to the surface property and the conservation purposes. There is
some evidence to suggest that horizontal drilling techniques and
fracturing may cause surface damage due to leaching of the
fracturing fluid and escaping of rogue gases from the fractured
rock.144 Fracturing fluid contains numerous volatile chemicals, some
of which are known to be harmful to humans and animals.145 The
risk of leaching, therefore, could pose a serious threat to the
conservation purposes of the easement. By allowing unitization,
conservation organizations argue that they would be allowing the
destruction of the very property they set out to protect.146 There are
two issues with this view.
First, Ohio’s conservation organizations may misperceive and
overestimate the risk from fracturing. In its simplest formulation,
risk can be explained as the probability of an event occurring times
the magnitude of the possible damage.147 Studies show that people
143. Fracking, OHIO ENVTL. COUNCIL, http://www.theoec.org/Fracking (last visited Feb. 26,
2014).
144. For an in-depth discussion of the potential surface impacts, see DIETRICH & DIETRICH,
supra note 1, at 35, 36, 39 and EPA, Study of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing
on Drinking Water Resources: Progress Report (Dec. 2012), available at http://
www.epa.gov/hfstudy/pdfs/hf-report20121214.pdf.
145. EPA, supra note 144, at 196-245.
146. See, e.g., Quail Hollow Fracking Event, BUCKEYE FOREST COUNCIL, available at
http://www.buckeyeforestcouncil.org/quail-hallow-fracking-event/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2014)
(equating fracking and unitization with exploitation and a “betrayal” of the public trust).
147. Bruce W. Smith et al., Neural Substrates of Reward Magnitude, Probability, and Risk
During a Wheel of Fortune Decision-Making Task, 44 NEUROIMAGE 600, 601 (2009).
1614 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1587
tend to overestimate the risk of an event occurring when the
magnitude of potential damage is high and the probability of the
event occurring is extremely low. In this way, fear of the event
taints an individual’s ability to accurately perceive and respond to
the risk.148 Moreover, risk perception can also be altered by leader-
ship credibility,149 perceptions of safety,150 and opinion leaders,151
among numerous other factors. Given all of the factors that confuse
risk perception, conservation organizations should not abstain from
acting based on their perceived risks. In other words, conservation
organizations must recognize the potential for overestimation and
not be paralyzed by a misconceived threat.
Second, if a surface disruption were to occur, the conservation
organization would not be financially responsible for the cleanup or
restoration of the property. In fact, the landowner would be held
liable to the conservation organization for the damages under the
enforcement clause of a conservation easement.152 This would be
especially true if the conservation organization created a stricter
enforcement clause, as argued in Part III of this Note.153 By having
a stricter enforcement clause, conservation organizations put the
landowner in the position to best balance his own liability. The
conservation organization should be indifferent to the decision of the
landowner to unitize because they are in the same position regard-
less of the landowner’s choice.154
Conservation organizations might respond to this argument by
claiming that the financial obligation to restore the property will not
truly be enough to repair the damaged property and that the
conservation easement will be completely lost if the landowner is
148. See Craig W. Trumbo, Information Processing and Risk Perception: An Adaptation of
the Heuristic-Systematic Model, 52 J. COMM. 367, 381 (2002); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 207, 209, 230 (1973).
149. Craig W. Trumbo et al., The Function of Credibility in Information Processing for Risk
Perception, 23 RISK ANALYSIS 343 (2003).
150. Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes
Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 POLY SCI. 127, 148-49 (1978).
151. Leisa Reinecke Flynn, Opinion Leaders and Opinion Seekers: Two New Measurement
Scales, 24 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 137, 137-38 (1996).
152. See supra Parts I.A., III.B.2.
153. See supra Part III.B.2.
154. Admittedly, this proposition assumes that the property can be fully restored or
replaced with the value of damages paid by the landowner.
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judgment proof. This contention is fair because a restoration project
could require millions of dollars and years to fully restore a
damaged property to its previous state. However, stricter monitor-
ing and enforcement clauses should protect the conservation
easement from these risks. By creating stricter monitoring clauses,
conservation organizations should be able to quickly detect damage,
mitigating the potential harm to the conservation easement.
Additionally, the monetary benefits from allowing unitization give
conservation organizations more financial flexibility to preserve
greater quantities of land. More preserved land means that the
impact from the loss of any one conservation easement is greatly
diminished.
B. Public Funding Concerns
Even though allowing unitization will preserve more property in
the end, allowing unitization might still risk damaging a conserva-
tion organization’s public image, and thus its main funding source.
Having a positive public perception is of critical importance for
conservation organizations because much of their funding comes
from donations.155 If a conservation organization allows subsurface
development, some donors might believe that they no longer have
the best interests of environmental preservation at heart and might
refuse to further donate to the organization. If enough donors refuse
to fund the conservation organization, the organization may become
insolvent.
While losing donors is a concern, oil and gas leases could offer the
conservation organization an additional revenue source. As
discussed in this Note, conservation organizations should require
landowners to pay the organization a percentage of the royalties
from the oil and gas extraction.156 Doing so is likely to create a
monetary boon for conservation organizations, which allows them
to disregard the risk that donors will stop funding them. In other
words, conservation organizations will no longer be subject to the
whims of their donors. Therefore, allowing a landowner to volun-
155. See Boyd et. al., supra note 5, at 234, 245.
156. See supra Part III.B.1.
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tarily unitize and have subsurface extraction of oil and gas should
result in a net monetary gain for conservation organizations.
CONCLUSION
The conflicting interests between conservation easements and oil
and gas leases likely will continue and be magnified by the recent
Marcellus and Utica Shale boom in Ohio. Ohio’s enabling legislation
for conservation easements overcomes the common law impedi-
ments and incorporates much of the IRC’s charitable contribution
language.157 The protection offered by conservation easements is
questionable, however, especially where the underlying mineral
estate has been severed. With severed mineral estates being too
risky, conservation organizations must make their conservation
easements more appealing to landowners of property with an
unsevered mineral estate. Therefore, conservation organizations
should alter their no-inconsistent use clauses to allow voluntary
unitization of the landowner’s mineral estate and do so retroactively
through the amendment process. However, such an amendment
might place conservation organizations in a difficult situation
because amending their easements might undermine the conserva-
tion organization’s standing in the community and negatively affect
donations. Conservation organizations should not be deterred,
however, because they will be able to increase revenue through
percentage royalty payments from landowners who opt to unitize.
While Ohio’s oil and gas boom poses a significant threat to conserva-
tion organizations and conservation easements, oil and gas may also
provide conservation organizations with opportunities to strengthen
their position in the land market. Conservation organizations must
be willing to embrace the boom rather than fight it. In this way,
both conservation easements and oil and gas leases can continue to
thrive in Ohio.
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